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Sovereignty or Sustainability in the Anthropocene 
Sam Adelman 
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Abstract 
Sovereignty is generally understood to comprise the bundle of powers of nation-states but 
legal theory is rarely captures the complexities of a unique and exceptional power. 
Historically, the exercise of sovereign prerogatives has resulted in sovereign exceptionalism 
that prioritises national interests over those of other states and the environment. The 
governance of tropical forests illustrates the tension between permanent sovereignty over 
national resources and the need to treat forests as global commons in the interests of all 
peoples. We can bequeath a habitable planet to future generations or we can choose to 
perpetuate national interest through sovereignty, but we cannot have both so long as 
sovereign prerogative trumps common good. 
Keywords Sovereignty, sustainability, no-harm rule, global commons, permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the tension between sovereignty and sustainability in the 
Anthropocene. Collective action by sovereign states through multilateral environmental 
agreements is a precondition for ecological sustainability the exercise of sovereign 
prerogative too often results in soft law that fails to halt unsustainable practices or the 
sovereign exceptionalism that underpins the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement. It seems we can have undiluted sovereignty or sustainability, but not both. 
1 Westphalian Sovereignty 
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The contemporary sovereign-centric system emerged from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 
Three centuries later, sovereignty and cosmopolitanism provided contrasting bases for the 
international relations.1 In 1945, the UN Charter reaffirmed sovereignty, commonly 
understood as supreme authority within a delineated territory, as the foundational organising 
principle of international law. In 1948, the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights offered alternative cosmopolitan paradigm in which the protection of human rights 
could be the cardinal principle. Classical social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes 
sought to resolve this tension by arguing that individual liberty requires strong sovereigns to 
provide security-giving rise to the paradoxical situation in which states, historically the most 
egregious violators of human rights, are required to act as their guarantors. The right to a 
clean, safe or healthy environment appears in numerous national constitutions, but human 
rights have not played a central role in environmental governance.2 
Kantorowicz described the existence of the king’s two bodies, one mortal and subject to 
decay, the other eternal and transcendent, 3 and sovereignty’s mystical and ethereal overtones 
have long facilitated sovereign exceptionalism. In modernity, sovereignty has become the 
autonomous and self-sufficient source of law. Koskenniemi argues that there is ‘simply no 
fixed meaning, no natural extent to sovereignty at all’.4 It is an object of desire and the stuff 
of nightmares, a unique power capable of deciding states of exception in which the law 
applies in its inapplicability.5 
Sovereignty comprises independence (external sovereignty), self-determination (internal 
sovereignty), and the power to make law arising from exclusive jurisdiction over a territory 
and permanent population. In theory, sovereign states are formally equal, voluntarily assume 
obligations, and have a duty not to intervene in the affairs of other states. State practice 
reveals these to be tantamount to international legal myths and sovereignty to be condemned 
as organised hypocrisy.6 Formal equality has been undermined by the substantive inequalities 
caused by colonialism and the structural power imbalances in the global political-economy. 
Weaker states have long understood that the principle of non-interference is honoured more 
in the breach than the observance and that binding obligations are not always voluntary 
 
1 Adelman (2011). 
2 177 countries recognize such a right in their constitutions, environmental legislation, jurisprudence, or through 
ratification of international instruments (United Nations Environment Programme 2017: 32-3). 
3 Kantorowicz (1997). 
4 Koskenniemi (2006: 242). 
5 Agamben (1998, 2005). 
6 Krasner (1999). 
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assumed. Decolonisation led to hard-won rights such as permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources (PSNR) that now serve to undermine ecological sustainability in countries with 
large tropical forests under their jurisdiction. Sovereign states almost invariably favour 
economic growth over ecological sustainability.7 Sustainable development, which is widely 
criticised as an oxymoron for this reason, cannot deliver environmental or climate justice for 
current or future generations so long as sovereign states seek to defy the reality that endless 
growth is not possible on a finite planet. 
Until the emergence of rapidly industrialising countries such as the BRICS states, the power 
of the global North led to historical injustices through unequal ecological exchange, the 
exploitation and appropriation of natural resources by transnational corporations who leached 
sovereignty away from developing countries without adequate compensation, and widespread 
environmental degradation.8 
Neoliberal globalisation and the growing power of markets and financial institutions has 
prompted analyses of the relative decline of sovereign nation-states. Sovereignty has been 
described as floating, disaggregated, pooled, split or shared by states in international 
institutions such as the WTO and regional blocs such as the European Union.9 Hardt and 
Negri famously argued that sovereignty has been decentred, deterritorialised, reconfigured 
and ‘taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united 
under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire’.10 
Sovereignty is complex and contradictory, unique and exceptional. Historically, sovereign 
rulers have regarded themselves as tethered to the law-which provides legitimacy- within but 
beyond it and thereby entitled to act with immunity and impunity. Max Weber, a sociologist, 
came closer to penetrating its essence in arguing that the ‘state is a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory’, which ‘is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of 
continuous organization’.11 Weber argued that sovereign power is inextricably linked to and 
dependent upon violence. In contrast, Michel Foucault insisted that treating sovereignty as 
hierarchy is a misconceived way of understanding modern power. What is needed instead is a 
‘political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore 
 
7 Adelman (2018). 
8 Miller (1998); Agarwal and Narain (1991). 
9 Sassen (1996). 
10 Hardt and Negri (2001: xii). 
11 Weber (2004: 33); Weber(1947: 156). 
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around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King’s head: in political 
theory that still has to be done’.12 Foucault viewed sovereignty as an anachronism symbolised 
by absolute monarchy’s capacity to ‘take life or let live’ whereas the aim of contemporary 
biopower is to ‘make live or let die’.13 
Carl Schmitt provided one of the most sophisticated analyses of sovereignty in legal theory, 
in arguing that sovereignty is exceptional: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ 
and is thereby able to suspend the ‘normal’ legal order, for example in a state of emergency.14 
The true nature of the sovereign is revealed in the decision on the exception, which cannot be 
‘made to conform to a preformed law’15 but is nonetheless rooted in a ‘legal system itself 
[which] can anticipate the exception and can “suspend itself”’.16 Reconceptualising Schmitt’s 
thesis, Giorgio Agamben argues that sovereignty is an unrelenting and illimitable power 
whose uniqueness flows from its power of life and death. Agamben contends that Foucault’s 
thesis must therefore be corrected or completed to reflect sovereignty’s intrinsically 
biopolitical character, which manifests itself in the production of bare life through the ban,17 
the means by which individuals are included in the law in order to exclude them from it. 
Sovereignty’s raison d’etre is the reproduction of its own existence. For Agamben, the 
refugee symbolises the nomos of political modernity in which the exception becomes 
generalised, normalised and unexceptional. Sovereignty reveals its nature in the gas 
chambers, the gulags, and Guantánamo Bay, in spaces of exception and zones d’attente in 
which people are included in the law through their exclusion from it. 
The sovereign-centric international legal system promotes bordered, territorial thinking18 at 
odds with the cooperation required to address transboundary problems such as climate change 
and the destruction of ecosystems. Sovereignty appears to be an indispensable precondition 
and an insurmountable impediment to achieving ecological sustainability. The Paris 
Agreement was heralded as an example of international collaboration reflecting the 
realisation that sovereignty must be circumscribed in the common interest; eighteen months 
later, in a manifestation of sovereign exceptionalism, Donald Trump declared his intention to 
withdraw from the accord, consistent with his nationalist-populist hostility to multilateralism. 
 
12 Foucault (1980: 121). 
13 Foucault (2003), 241. 
14 Schmitt (1985: 5). Schmitt was a Nazi, and much of thinking about sovereignty sought to rationalise Hitler’s 
rule. 
15 Ibid, 6. 
16 Ibid, 14. 
17 Agamben (1998: 9). 
18 That Beck (2006) called the national outlook. 
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Reducing greenhouse gas emissions may be regarded as a common but differentiated 
responsibility of all states but, as under George W. Bush, the United States exercised its 
sovereign prerogative to exempt itself from international law. The text of the Agreement, 
which is legally binding but unenforceable, reflects the brittleness of the sovereign 
sensibilities of adherents to undiluted Westphalian sovereignty such as China and the United 
States. For example, article 13.3 declares that the transparency framework must be 
‘implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national 
sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties’. 
Capra and Mattei describe the shift from commons to capital and the emergence of private 
and sovereign property as defining characteristics of modern mechanistic jurisprudence: 
‘private ownership—individual dominion over land—became the most important legal 
concept, dividing the whole into individualistic components. The mechanism governing the 
relationship between these parts was found in what became the sovereign state.’19 
In the Westphalian system, the Earth is divided into areas under sovereign jurisdiction and 
global commons. States are entitled to exploit the natural resources under their control 
without external interference. In principle, the exploitation of natural resources such as 
tropical forest carbon sinks is subject to international environmental law principles such as 
the no-harm rule, the polluter pays principle and the precautionary approach, but this body of 
law is deeply anthropocentric and replete with soft law. Fossil-fuelled industrialisation has 
led to the breaching of planetary boundaries and the rupture to the Earth system.20 Apart from 
exceptions such as Bolivia and Ecuador whose constitutions protect the rights of Mother 
Earth (Pachamama), nature itself has no legal personality and no rights, making it difficult to 
rectify environmental harms through normal legal channels.21 Although it is unlikely such a 
right could withstand sovereignty’s depredations. 
3. No-harm Rule 
The no-harm principle, according to which states must ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction do not cause significant cross-boundary environmental damage, was enunciated 
in the Trail Smelter arbitral award of 194122 and reaffirmed in Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
 
19 Capra and Mattei (2015: 45). 
20 Rockström et al (2009). 
21 Nature has been accorded legal personality in some countries, for example the Whanganui River in New 
Zealand, but these are exceptions that prove the rule. In July 2017, the Indian Supreme Court overturned a ruling 
by the High Court in Uttarakhand giving the Ganges and Yamuna rivers the same legal status as human beings: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-40537701 (accessed 30 November 2017). 
22 United States v Canada (1941) 3 UNRIAA 1905 at 1965. 
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Declaration, which recognises the sovereign right of states to exploit their natural resources 
pursuant and to their own environmental policies, and their responsibility not to cause 
damage to the environment of other countries.23 This formulation is repeated in the preamble 
to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Sustainable 
Development Goals. The principle is widely regarded as a customary rule of international law 
and the cornerstone of international environmental law, but it has not played a significant role 
in climate change regime, in which sustainable development and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities in the light of different national 
circumstances is more prominent. 
The presence of conflicting principles is common in multilateral environmental agreements. 
The UNFCCC notes the sovereign right of states to exploit their natural resources and their 
duty to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not harm the environment of other 
countries. PSNR originated in the 1950s as a manifestation of the right to self-determination 
because developing countries were concerned that foreign transnational corporations were the 
main beneficiaries of their natural resources.24 In 1966, the UN General Assembly recognised 
‘the inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources in the interest of their national development.’25 
Natural resources may be designated as the common heritage of humankind under 
international environmental law and obligations imposed on states to protect common 
resources. Some natural resources are fully under exclusive sovereign jurisdiction, others are 
shared between two or more states, e.g. tropical forests and rivers, and some are completely 
outside national jurisdiction such as global commons: the high seas, the deep seabed, outer 
space, the Moon and other celestial bodies, and Antarctica. Governing the atmosphere as a 
common resource is essential to prevent greenhouse gas emissions from causing irreversible 
anthropogenic warming, but neo-extractive, neoliberal policies are facilitating an 
unprecedented global land grab that threatens commons throughout the global South and 
undermines the food and water security of millions.26 
4. Global Commons 
 
23 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment (1972). Duncan French (2001: 381) views the Stockholm Declaration’s no harm rule 
as the ‘most fundamental rule of modern international environmental law’. 
24 Schrijver (1997). 
25 G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), UN GAOR, Twenty-First Session (1966). 
26 Dell’Angelo et al (2017). 
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Global commons are not owned by individuals or corporations and are not subject to 
sovereign jurisdiction. Access is theoretically free and unlimited. Garrett Hardin erroneously 
argued that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is caused by unregulated overuse that leads to 
exhaustion of the resource.27 Effective commons governance involves controlling access and 
creating long-term incentives to conserve and protect rather than over exploit natural 
resources such as forests.28 Hardin’s contention that preservation of commons is 
economically irrational has been discredited by Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators, amongst 
others.29 Ostrom identified eight principles that underpin successful self-governance of 
commons and showed how rules and structures emerge from the bottom up for the 
governance of common pool resources based upon collective, participatory decision-making 
and regulation of access and exclusion. Rules are enforced by accountable monitors, 
violations punished through graduated sanctions, and conflicts resolved through cheap and 
accessible dispute resolution mechanisms. She showed how nested governance structures 
using a wide variety of rules, norms, principles, institutions, decision-making procedures, and 
enforcement mechanisms offer viable alternatives to centralised sovereign-centric regulation. 
Ostrom and her collaborators differentiate non-cooperative, self-interested commons users, 
those unwilling to cooperate with others unless they are protected against free riders, those 
willing to cooperate in principal in the hope that their trust will be reciprocated, and genuine 
altruists willing to work for the common good. 
Translating terrestrial commons governance into effective regulation of the atmosphere 
requires cooperative collective action through the pooling of sovereignty rather than treating 
it as a zero-sum power game. Time will reveal whether the incentive and transparency 
mechanisms in the Paris Agreement designed to promote cooperation and increase collective 
ambition are effective, but these are clearly undermined when significant actors such as the 
United States place narrow, short-term self-interest above collaboration. 
Burns Weston and David Bollier’s paradigm of green governance is based upon commons 
governance in which the state moves ‘from serving as the sovereign master of a closed, 
hierarchical system to the light-touch host of an open, diverse network’.30 They seek to 
overcome the regulatory failures of the ‘State/Market’ by exploiting the possibilities offered 
by decentralised, rights-based Vernacular Law that privileges local governance and 
 
27 Hardin (1968). 
28 Ostrom, et al (1999). 
29 Ostrom (1990). 
30 Weston and Bollier (2013: 257). 
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subsidiarity—‘the “unofficial” norms, institutions, and procedures that a peer community 
devises to manage its resources on its own, and typically democratically’. 31 The state may set 
the parameters within which Vernacular Law operates, but it does not directly control how 
commons are organised and managed.32 They argue that this New Commons paradigm 
provides an ‘intellectual scaffolding that can be used to develop innovative legal and policy 
norms, institutions, and procedures relative to a given resource or set of resources’ that will 
operate in a quasi-sovereign manner that ‘enacts new forms of governance without becoming 
government’.33 They acknowledge that substantial legal changes are required such as a 
reconceptualization of contract and property law, the creation of trusts to manage and lease 
common ecological resources, the expansion of the public trust doctrine, and the use of 
digital technology to make governance transparent, participatory and accountable. This is 
challenging, but drastic change is the only way to rescue humanity from the totalising, 
dystopian neoliberal fantasy of endless growth and consumption. 
The contradictions of sovereignty are illustrated by governance of tropical forests, which 
have variously been treated as natural resources under sovereign control, local commons, or 
global commons.34 As carbon sinks, forest conservation is crucial in addressing climate 
change. Governance of the Amazon is under the jurisdiction and permanent sovereignty of 
host states which collectively permit an area the size of Wales to disappear every year, 
leading to violations of the rights indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers whose 
livelihoods depend upon forest conservation. Tropical forests are increasingly regulated 
under the 2013 Warsaw Framework on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD+), which aims to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries, conserve and promote sustainable management of 
forests, and enhance of carbon stocks in developing countries. The regime provides results-
based finance from the Green Climate Fund if host countries comply with a range of 
measuring, reporting and verification mechanisms that attenuate the sovereignty of host 
countries. 
 
31 Ibid, xx. 
32 Vernacular refers to the informal, quotidian methods by which people negotiate rules and devise governance 
norms and practices. 
33 Weston and Bollier (2013: 124, 125. 
34 Adelman (2015, 2017). 
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Evidence suggests that forests should ideally be treated as the common heritage of mankind 
and governed as global commons.35 As Schrijver argues, the common heritage principle is 
incompatible with PSNR,36 and Boyd writes that attempts to construct ‘a comprehensive 
international legal instrument on forests have floundered on the fundamental conflict between 
the conception of tropical forests as the “common heritage of mankind” and forests as 
sovereign national resources’.37 
5. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
The PSNR principle ‘allows states within limits established by international law to conduct or 
authorise such activities as they choose within their territories, including activities which may 
have adverse effects on their own environment’.38 Takacs points out that ‘sovereignty over 
natural resources is not “permanent”—or even temporary—if forests degrade or disappear 
due to changing ecological conditions’.39 Tarlock calls for a modified conception of 
sovereignty based upon: 
erga omnes duties to require more sustainable use of national territories such as 
tropical rainforests and wetland systems. The legal rationale is that the potential 
adverse global impacts of ecosystem modification may make them part of the 
common heritage of mankind or a matter of common concern or common interest.40 
Similarly, Scholtz argues for custodial sovereignty that respects the right of states to exploit 
their natural resources while creating the expectation that these resources will be protected on 
behalf of humanity.41 Other states would be obliged to assist the custodian state to fulfil its 
obligations consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capacities. 
In 2007, in the Yasuní—Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini (ITT) Initiative, Ecuador proposed 
keeping 846 million barrels of crude oil in the ground in one of the most biodiverse regions 
of the Amazon if other countries were willing to reimburse the country by $3.6 billion—
 
35 Sands (2003: 546-47) argues that ‘Attempts by developed countries to “internationalise” forest issues have so 
far been unsuccessful in legal terms, and the tropical forest resources of developing countries are carefully 
guarded as part of the national patrimony of these countries’. Mgbeoji (2003: 828) views the notion of common 
heritage as ‘a barely disguised ideological tool in the politics of and struggle for control of plant genetic 
resources across the globe’. 
36 Schrijver (1997:229). 
37 Boyd (2010: 865). 
38 Sands (2003: 236). 
39 Takacs (2013: 710). 
40 Tarlock (2007: 587). 
41 Scholtz (2008). 
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roughly half the value of the oil. The aims of the initiative included the protection of 
biodiversity, respect for the territory and rights of indigenous peoples, combatting climate 
change, and ecologically sustainable development, and the funds would have been used for 
social and environmental development programmes and the promotion of domestic renewable 
energy. By 2013, the ITT had failed due to a lack of donors and financing, political pressure 
to exploit the oil reserves, Ecuador’s commitment to oil exploitation elsewhere in the 
country, Ecuador, the risk of leakage through carbon offsets, and suspicions about the 
government’s motives.42 
6. Conclusion 
The Anthropocene exposes the limitations of the sovereign-centric system in which 
transboundary environmental problems cannot be solved through territorially-bounded 
regulatory responses. Sovereignty, the cardinal organising principle of international 
(environmental) law is often incompatible with the ecological sustainability, confronting us 
with the conundrum of how to circumscribe sovereign power in an international legal system 
in which sovereignty is the foundation stone. Sovereignty is inextricably linked to 
unsustainable business as usual in the form of sustainable development. Fredric Jameson 
observed that ‘it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of 
capitalism.’43 It also seems easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of 
state sovereignty. We can bequeath a habitable planet to future generations or we can choose 
to perpetuate national interest through sovereignty, but we cannot have both so long as 
sovereign prerogative trumps common good. The dilemma becomes more acute with the 
realisation that the path to commons governance and ecological sustainability lies through 
sovereignty and that global natural resources such as the climate system, water, the air and 
the atmosphere are the common heritage of humankind and vital to the common weal. 
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